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Probability and arguments: 
Keynes’s legacy
William Peden ,*
John Maynard Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability is the seminal text for the logical in-
terpretation of probability. According to his analysis, probabilities are evidential re-
lations between a hypothesis and some evidence, just like the relations of deductive 
logic. While some philosophers had suggested similar ideas prior to Keynes, it was 
not until his Treatise that the logical interpretation of probability was advocated in 
a clear, systematic and rigorous way. I trace Keynes’s influence in the philosophy 
of probability through a heterogeneous sample of thinkers who adopted his inter-
pretation. This sample consists of Frederick C.  Benenson, Roy Harrod, Donald 
C. Williams, Henry E. Kyburg and David Stove. The ideas of Keynes prove to be 
adaptable to their diverse theories of probability. My discussion indicates both the 
robustness of Keynes’s probability theory and the importance of its influence on the 
philosophers whom I describe. I also discuss the Problem of the Priors. I argue that 
none of those I discuss have obviously improved on Keynes’s theory with respect 
to this issue.
Key words:  John Maynard Keynes, History of probability, Philosophy of probability 
induction, Logical probability
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1. Introduction
In A Treatise on Probability, John Maynard Keynes (1921) provided the first systematic, 
subtle and self-conscious theory of what philosophers now call ‘logical probability’. 
I shall focus on a single thesis by Keynes and trace its influence. This thesis is that prob-
ability is an evidential relation holding between an ordered pair of sets of statements. Modern 
logicians generally define an ‘argument’ to be an ordered pair of sets of statements.1 
Thus, another way of understanding Keynes’s thesis is that probability is a feature of ar-
guments. Hypotheses have probabilities only derivatively, by being the conclusion of an 
argument with that probability relation. This is the key distinctive feature of the logical 
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1 Or propositions etc. I shall switch between these depending on the usage of the philosopher I am dis-
cussing. Differences between propositions and statements are important, but not here.
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interpretation of probability.2 For brevity, I shall use ‘relationism’ to denote this view. 
I shall argue for the following:
 (1) Keynes’s relationism influenced an intellectually diverse group of philosophers of 
probability. This variety indicates the robustness of relationism.
 (2) The Problem of the Priors tends to be why these philosophers depart from Keynes, 
but their theories do not obviously improve on his theory in this respect.
I shall begin by explaining relationism, before discussing its influence among a variety 
of philosophers. My sample was chosen using criteria of (a) influence from Keynes, (b) 
the differences among the philosophers and (c) the extent to which they have not been 
discussed by historians. Consideration (a) excludes a number of famous relationists, 
including Gottfried Leibniz, W. E. Johnson and Harold Jeffreys, because they devel-
oped their ideas independently (or mostly independently) of Keynes. Consideration 
(c) excludes Rudolf Carnap, who has been discussed at length by historians of prob-
ability. My sample is not exhaustive, but it will establish my theses.
2. Keynes’s interpretation
Throughout, by ‘a theory of probability’, I shall mean the combination of (1) an account 
of what statements about probabilities mean (or should mean) and (2) a theory of 
which probability statements are true. I shall call (1) an ‘interpretation’ of probability. 
For lack of a better term, I shall call (2) a ‘semantics’ of probability. There are many 
theories of probability. Some view probabilities as subjective degrees of belief, with 
just a few constraints on what constitutes rational beliefs (de Finetti, 1964). Others 
identify probabilities with uniquely rational degrees of belief (Williamson, 2010). And 
still others view probability as an objective feature of physical reality (Von Mises, 1951; 
Popper, 1957). Moreover, there are many pluralists, who adopt multiple interpretations 
(Carnap, 1962). An interpretation will often indicate, but not determine, a seman-
tics for probability. For some interpretations, such as frequentism, which statements 
are true depends on logico-mathematically contingent facts, i.e. facts outwith logical 
facts about statements/arguments and mathematical facts about numbers, models, and 
other mathematical entities. (I shall use ‘contingent’ to mean logico-mathematically 
contingent.) However, in Keynes’s theory, the semantics is a matter of abstract logical 
relations. Keynes (1921) argues that probability is relational: it holds between two pro-
positions or sets of propositions. A proposition H is only probable or improbable in the 
derivative sense that H is probable or improbable in relation to a set of propositions. 
It follows that there can be no unconditional probabilities of the form P(H) = r for 
some real number r.3 Keynes also thought that probability is logical, in a broad sense 
of ‘logic’ that includes deductive and non-deductive argumentation. Deductive logi-
cians study arguments with respect to whether they are deductively valid, i.e. whether 
their premises (or ‘evidence’) provide maximally strong evidence to their conclusions 
(or ‘hypotheses’). For brevity, I shall use ‘valid’ for ‘deductively valid’. Keynes’s theory 
2 ‘Logical probability’ is sometimes used for the more general idea that there are objective epistemic 
probabilities. However, objectivity does not entail that probability is relational, since there could be objective 
unconditional probabilities, as in the classical theory of probability.
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generalises logic to all arguments, including evidential relations within invalid argu-
ments. Keynes agrees with ‘frequentist’ probability theorists that the truth or falsity 
of a probability statement like (i) ‘It will probably rain tomorrow’ is objective, in the 
sense that its truth or falsity is independent of our opinions. He thus denied subject-
ivism. However, Keynes denies that the truth or falsity of (i) is determined by relative 
frequencies. Instead, if it is true, then it is true in the same way as the deductive logic 
statement (ii) ‘The premises that it will be cloudy tomorrow and that it will be rainy 
tomorrow deductively imply that it will be rainy tomorrow’. According to a relationist 
interpretation, the truth-value of both (i) and (ii) depends on logical facts about ar-
guments. Superficially, (i) seems to be very different from (ii). On Keynes’s interpret-
ation, this appearance is just because (ii) makes its premises explicit. Implicit premises 
are common in probabilistic reasoning, just like deductive reasoning. (Argumentation 
would be very tedious otherwise). Typically, a statement like (i) tacitly refers to a re-
lation between our relevant evidence (weather reports, historical trends, that the air 
pressure is dropping etc.) and the statement said to be probable. In this example, this 
statement said to be probable is ‘It will rain tomorrow’. However, the information is 
not always implicit. For instance:
 (iii)  ‘Since the card was randomly selected from a normal deck, the probability that it 
is an Ace of Spaces is 1/52’.
—and:
 (iv)  ‘This coin has landed Heads in all of the 50 times I’ve tossed it, so probably it’s 
biased towards Heads’.
—both state some of the relevant evidence. Thus, a hypothesis’s logical probability is 
always a relation between that hypothesis and some premises. These premises might 
refer to relative frequencies, but the probability is not identical with them.
Probabilities are also not identical to rational degrees of belief; instead, they are rela-
tions between propositions (Keynes, 1921, p. 5). Nonetheless, probabilities can guide 
our beliefs (Keynes, 1921, p. 2, p. 351.). In this respect, probabilities are again akin to 
deductive relations like entailment or contradiction. We should not believe contradic-
tions if we want to know the truth, but it does not follow that ‘contradiction’ can be 
defined this way. Similarly, if we are rational and we want to have true beliefs, then we 
should be confident in hypotheses that are probable in relation to our evidence, but 
Keynes’s interpretation of probability is not definable in terms of rational confidence.
Another notable feature of Keynes’s theory is probabilities are often imprecise, in 
that they cannot be identified with a real number (Keynes, 1921, pp. 181–3). There 
is sometimes precision according to his theory. Indeed, when the premises fea-
ture a contradiction, there is no apparent probability relation at all (Keynes, 1921, 
pp. 127–8). A  broad class of precise probabilities occur under the conditions of 
Keynes’s carefully revised version of the Principle of Indifference (POI). If:
 (1) The set of statements A = {H1, H2… Hn} are each possible given the evidence E.
 (2) If E is true, only one hypothesis in A can be true.
 (3) Each hypothesis in A can be expressed in the same logical form as the others. The 
logical ‘form’ or ‘argument form’ is what results from substituting variables for 
terms other than logical constants into an argument. Logical constants are terms 
like ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘if…then’.
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 (5) The terms in A’s members and E are all meaningful.
 (6) E does not favour any hypothesis in A over any other member of A.
—then the probability in relation to E of each hypothesis Hi among the n-fold hy-
potheses in A is P(Hi | E) = 1/n (Keynes, 1921, pp. 62–7). In contemporary nota-
tion, if there is a precise probability relation between H and E, Keynes advocates that 
P(H | E) = r means that the logical strength of an argument from E to H is r.
Keynesian probabilities are independent of contingent facts. They share this feature 
with deductive relations. For instance, the following argument is valid:
 (1a) All cats are kind to birds.
 (2a) Keith is a cat. Therefore, (3a) Keith is kind to birds.
 —even though (1a) is false. Its validity is independent of contingent facts about how 
the world happens to be
Similarly, in Keynes’s theory, the inductive argument:
 (1b)  Under a great variety of circumstances, Keith and all the many other known cats 
are kind to birds.
Therefore, (2b) All cats are kind to birds
—has a probability relation between (1b) and (2b) that is independent of contingent 
facts. For instance, the probability relation is the same regardless of whether the sample 
described in (1b) is unrepresentative of cats in general.
Keynes’s theory is pregnant with a whole litter of fascinating philosophical ideas. 
There is logical probability relations’ objectivity (McCann, 1994; Gillies, 2006). There 
is his idea that probability relations can be inexpressible by real numbers (Runde, 1994; 
Brady and Arthmar, 2012). There are Keynes’s views on the connections of probability 
with uncertainty and ontology (Lawson, 1985, 2003). There is probability’s connection 
with his general epistemology (Carabelli, 1988; O’Donnell, 1989). Keynes’s influence 
with respect to these ideas is an even wider topic. However, his legacy in the philosophy 
of probability is still largely unexplored. Additionally, philosophical and historical dis-
cussions of relationism tend to focus on Carnap (e.g. Salmon, 1967; for an exception 
that focuses on Keynes, see Rowbottom 2015, Chapter 3). Given Carnap’s historical 
importance in philosophy, the focus on him is understandable. However, it creates a 
misleadingly narrow impression of Keynes’s influence, and a misleadingly tight associ-
ation between relationism and Carnap. My inquiry will help remedy these misconcep-
tions. For each thinker I discuss, I shall briefly provide some biographical information, 
then explain their interpretations, then their semantics, then Keynes’s influence on them, 
and finally the plausibility of their views in relation to the Problem of the Priors.
3. Frederick C. Benenson
Benenson advocated a relationist theory of probability during a period when Keynes’s 
ideas were unfashionable among philosophers (Benenson, 1984, p.  1). Benenson 
studied at Harvard and Oxford (New York Times, 1978). He was a lecturer at the 
University of Birmingham until 2004 (Benenson Capital, 2014, p. 6). He wrote several 
publications in the late 1970s and early 1980s; his Probability, Objectivity and Evidence 
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3.1 Interpretation
Benenson’s version of relationism is idiosyncratic, but he credits with Keynes for his 
interpretation of probability (Benenson, 1984, pp.  13–4), describing Keynes as the 
‘ancestor’ of his theory (Benenson, 1984, p. 45). Like Keynes, Benenson thought that 
relationism can accommodate all the rational uses of probabilistic concepts. In con-
trast, most contemporary philosophers of probability are pluralists: they adopt dif-
ferent interpretations for different probability statements. For example, they might 
adopt frequentist interpretations of the use of ‘probability’ in scientific theories (some-
times called ‘physical probability’) but another interpretation for appraising theories’ 
evidential support. Benenson argues that, for both the uses of ‘probability’ in scientific 
theories and these theories’ appraisals, we should typically interpret the term as refer-
ring to an evidential relation between a hypothesis and what Benenson called ‘total 
statistical evidence’. For a probability statement S being assessed by a particular scien-
tist in a time period t, the total statistical evidence is what the entire human race could, 
in principle, ascertain during t (pp. 208–9). Total statistical evidence is thus distinct 
from the ‘total evidence’ that relationists like have typically thought appropriate for 
probabilistic reasoning: total evidence is just the evidence available to an individual at 
the moment of their reasoning.
3.2 Semantics
What probability statements are true according to Benenson? We can understand his 
semantics by starting with an idea from Carnap (1952). For a simple and unambiguous 
formal language consisting of logically independent predicates F, G etc. and names of 
distinct individuals a, b, c etc., we can fully characterise a probability distribution via 
its values for the following schema: 
Key
ER: A sample report describing the joint frequency of F and G according to our total 
statistical evidence.
n: The joint occurrence of F and G described in ER.
s: The size of the sample.
λ and k: Other parameters affecting the probability value. These are important in 
Carnap’s probability theory, but not here.
P(Fa | Ga & ER) =
n+ λ/k
s+ λ
Benenson argues for setting λ and k to zero, so that the probability of Fa in relation 
to Ga and ER is the value that ER reports for the sample frequency of F’s among G’s 
(Benenson, 1984, pp. 103–13). For example, if ER just asserts that 7 of 10 G things are 
F, then P(Fa | Ga & ER) = 0.7.
Things are messier in the natural languages that we actually speak, but the spirit of 
Benenson’s semantics is that probabilities are equal to sample frequencies reported in 
the total statistical evidence. Hence, there cannot be probabilities in relation to prem-
ises without sample reports. Benenson’s semantics thus leaves many arguments (those 
lacking reported sample frequencies) without probability values.
In practice, we must estimate the frequency in the total statistical evidence using 
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Benenson endorsed confidence interval methods for (imprecise) ‘second-order’ prob-
abilities that the relative frequency in the total statistical evidence is within a particular 
interval (Benenson, 1984, pp. 210–4).
3.3 Influence
A curious feature of Benenson’s theory is that it is sample frequencies that matter for 
probabilities; sample sizes are irrelevant. Therefore, if two evidence reports ER1 and ER2 
report the same frequencies in two different samples, then P(Fa | ER1) = P(Fa | ER2) 
even if ER1 describes a tiny sample and ER2 describes a sample of thousands. Benenson 
argues that P(Fa | Ga & ER) is only relevant for our beliefs if ER describes a large 
sample. To take an extreme example, if ER just asserts that ‘Fb and Gb’ , obviously we 
should not be maximally certain that a will be an F. Benenson never explained what 
constitutes a sufficiently large sample. Nonetheless, this features indicates the influence 
of Keynes’s separation of the concepts of probability and belief. Keynes’s separation 
makes it possible to talk about probabilities without corresponding rational degrees 
of belief, just as we can talk about deductive arguments that do not justify inferring 
their conclusions. For example, in classical logic, a contradiction implies every state-
ment, but believing a contradiction does not entitle us to believe every statement. 
Thus, Benenson’s views on the connection of probability with belief make crucial use 
of Keynes’s relationism.
3.4 Priors
By the ‘Problem of the Priors’, I shall mean this issue: many relationist theories, such 
as Carnap’s, imply that we can (should!) have strong beliefs about empirical hypoth-
eses due to mere facts about logical possibilities. In a relationist theory, the a priori 
probabilities (the ‘initial priors’) are the probabilities of statements in relation to tau-
tologies, i.e. logically true statements, since tautologies do not assert anything that 
we would need to know a posteriori. For example, if P(Hi | t) = 0.5 for each i of an 
n-fold exchangeable sequence of hypotheses, a tautology t, and n is large, then the hy-
pothesis ‘H1 or H2 or…or Hn’ will be highly probable in relation to t. In other words, 
an equivocal (neutral) prior for each Hi implies a strong (non-neutral) prior for other 
hypotheses. For example, your priors might be equivocal towards each of a set of coin 
tosses landing Heads, but very unequivocal towards the conjecture that one of them 
will land Heads. I shall discuss possible Keynesian responses to this problem in my 
conclusion.4
Benenson avoids the Problem of the Priors, because logical probabilities only exist 
with evidence that contains relative frequency data. Yet there is a cost: the priors do 
not soften the impact of new evidence. For instance, according to Benenson’s theory 
P(Fa | Ga & Fb & Gb) = 1. If probability were rational belief, this would imply 
maximal certainty for Fa given the evidence. Benenson’s sample size restrictions avoid 
this consequence. However, this solution seems to throw out the baby with the bath-
water: small samples might be weak evidence, but they do indicate something. For ex-
ample, if b is an F and a G, then F and G must be physically compatible. Benenson 
4 In a very different way, the Problem of the Priors also afflicts the more popular subjective Bayesian the-
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might argue that his theory accommodates weak evidence via the imprecision of esti-
mates, but in some cases no estimates will be necessary e.g. if we know that a and b are 
the only things that are G. In contrast, Keynes can represent weak evidence using im-
precise probabilities, such as P(Fa | Ga & Fb & Gb) > 0, which acknowledges the 
weak but genuine relevance of such evidence. Benenson’s theory thus seems to have no 
ultimately advantages for the Problem of the Priors.
4. Roy Harrod
Harrod (1900–78) was greatly influenced by Keynes in many respects. This influence 
began in 1922, when Harrod (then an Oxford Lecturer) visited for a term at King’s 
College Cambridge and was guided in his research by Keynes (Caldentey, 2019, 
pp. 7–8). Harrod is best known today as an economist, but his philosophical research 
was widely reviewed and discussed in the 1950s. His overarching philosophical aim 
was to answer David Hume’s sceptical challenge to induction. Harrod tried to estab-
lish that the premises of inductive arguments can have a strong probability relation in 
favour of their conclusions, even though the conclusions’ truth is never guaranteed by 
the premises. I shall focus on his ideas about probability, rather than induction.
4.1 Interpretation
Harrod was an explicit relationist, defining probability ‘as a relation between prem-
isses and conclusion…’ (Harrod, 1961, p. 45). According to Harrod, the probability 
relation is positive if the frequency of truth among statements with the conclusion’s 
logical form would be greater than 50%, were the premises true. For instance, suppose 
we believe that we are conducting Bernoulli trials with a coin that lands Heads with a 
frequency of about r%. Predictions of the form ‘The coin will land Heads about r% of 
the time in n trials’, where n is a large number, for all of the possible trials, would be 
true more often than not, so such predictions are favourable relative to our premises. 
This analysis in terms of truth-frequencies differs from Keynes’s relationism, because 
Harrod’s analysis of the probability relation only makes sense in cases where the prem-
ises contain information about relative frequencies. By contrast, in Keynes’s theory, 
arguments such as analogical arguments can probabilify a hypothesis using premises 
about similarities, with no mention of relative frequencies. However, Harrod thought 
that all good argumentation—including analogical arguments—could be interpreted 
in terms of evidence about relative frequencies (Harrod, 1956, p. 248; pp. 255–6), so 
the divergence is not important.
4.2 Semantics
Harrod admired Keynes’s work on probability, but disagreed on many questions 
of semantics. Firstly, Harrod rejected initial priors (Harrod, 1961, pp. 44–6).5 He 
even rejected initial comparative priors, such as the principle that simpler laws have 
a greater initial probability than more complex laws (Harrod, 1956, Chapter 6). In 
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logical terms, Harrod requires logically contingent information in the argument’s 
premises, if there is to be a probability relation. Therefore, tautologies, which are not 
logically contingent, cannot be the premises. Harrod thus rejects the POI, in favour 
of his ‘the Principle of Experience’. He formulates this principle in mathematical 
detail, but I  shall just describe his informal intuition. According to Harrod, given 
some continuous process (such as a sequence of events, traversing a region of space 
in a straight line, and so on) we are more likely ceteris paribus to be far from the pro-
cesses’ end of that process than near or at it (Harrod, 1956, p. 78). Harrod’s main 
example is someone travelling along a large expanse, such as an unfamiliar forest 
or desert. If the traveller supposes that they are not at the edge, then they would 
be right more often than not. Therefore, without additional information, there is a 
probability in favour of the hypothesis that they are not at the edge of the expanse, 
relative to their knowledge. The Principle of Experience was Harrod’s fundamental 
tool for constructing induction-friendly prior probability distributions to answer 
Hume’s scepticism. Finally, another divergence of Harrod from Keynes is that the 
former’s probabilities are always precise (Harrod, 1956, pp.  34–5). However, this 
difference is not very significant because Harrod argues that precise probabilities are 
typically unknowable for humans, due to the immense complexity of the evidential 
relations in more interesting arguments in science and ordinary life (Harrod, 1956, 
p. 36). Whether precise probabilities in such cases are unknowable or non-existent 
makes little difference for our practical reasoning, nor even philosophical questions 
of epistemology.
4.3 Influence
Surprisingly, Harrod does not directly note Keynes’s influence in his intellectual auto-
biography in (Harrod, 1956, pp. ix–xix). However, since Harrod does not attribute 
relationism to anyone other than Keynes and given that he was very familiar with the 
Treatise on Probability, it is highly plausible that Keynes was the source of Harrod’s 
interpretation. Another sign is that, in Harrod’s first foray from economics into the 
philosophy of probability (Harrod, 1942), Keynes is the only philosopher of prob-
ability cited (p. 56)— and the only citation! Keynes’s influence on Harrod is clearest 
insofar as Harrod sees him as a point of departure. Harrod typically uses contrasts 
with Keynes to explain the distinctive elements of his own theory, which suggests that 
Harrod saw Keynes as the first word on probability. It is true that Harrod sometimes 
discounts Keynes’s work as ‘just a sketch’ (Harrod, 1956, p. 19) or ‘sketchy’ (p. 27). 
He even criticises Keynes’s combination of relationism with the POI as ‘a confusion of 
thought’ (p. 27). However, these remarks show that Harrod sees Keynes’s theory as a 
prototype: an early version needing improvements, but still the proper starting point 
for Harrod’s own inquiries. Furthermore, Harrod saw the rejection of initial priors 
as a consequence of taking Keynes’s relationism seriously. Just as many economists 
have regarded themselves as more Keynesian than Keynes, so Harrod regarded him-
self as more faithful to Keynes’s philosophy of probability than John Maynard. Despite 
his general admiration for Keynes’s ideas in both economics and philosophy, he was 
willing to disagree with Keynes on some matters in order to preserve their shared re-
lationist interpretation of probability. He did not try to muddy the waters to protect 
Keynes from (perceived) problems; Harrod’s intellectual honesty was even stronger 
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4.4 Priors
Harrod regarded it as obvious there can be no logical deductive or probabilistic rela-
tion between a contingent conclusion and a priori continent premises, like a tautology 
t. Given the absence of such a relation and assuming relationism, it follows that there 
can be no probability for such arguments, and hence no initial priors. However, his 
‘Principle of Experience’ redistributes the same basic worry: what justification do we 
have, without evidence, to believe this strong claim about the universe? Additionally, 
Harrod’s argument against initial priors are not convincing. They are based on the al-
leged absence of a probabilistic logical relation between a tautologous premise t and 
a contingent conclusion H. Yet, even in classical deductive logic, H and t do have a 
logical relation: a relation of asymmetric implication, whereby H implies t but t neither 
implies nor contradicts H. If such statements can have a deductive logical relationship, 
then why not a probabilistic relationship? It is when we face the problem of trying to 
characterise this relationship that the Problem of the Priors re-emerges.
5. Donald C. Williams
Williams (1899–83) is now principally known for his work on metaphysics and the justi-
fication of induction (Campbell et al., 2019). However, his views on probability are un-
usual and wide-ranging. From his institutionally influential position at Harvard, Williams 
shaped much of American philosophy in the later 20th century, with massively influential 
doctoral students, such as Roderick Chisholm and Donald Davidson. He wrote in the 
mid-20th century, when many philosophers thought that philosophical problems were 
due to linguistic confusions and needed to be ‘dissolved’ rather than solved. In contrast, 
Williams—like Keynes—took a traditional view of philosophical problems: questions 
like ‘How should we interpret probability statements?’ were meaningful questions that 
could be solved by careful theorising, plus rigorous attention to empirical and logico-
mathematical facts. See (Campbell et al., 2019) for more biographical details.
5.1 Interpretation
Williams agrees with Keynes that probability is a generalisation of deductive logic to 
invalid but evidentially relevant arguments (Williams, 1947, Chapter 2). However, like 
Harrod, Williams analyses logical probabilities in terms of truth-frequencies. To under-
stand ‘truth-frequencies’, consider this example. If we substituted a unique name for each 
swan x into the argument form below and (1c) were true, then the deductive argument:
 (1c) 100% of swans are white.
 (2c) x is a swan.
Therefore, (3c) x is white.
—would have a truth-frequency of 100%—we would always be right using the ar-
gument form for each swan. Williams analyses the argument’s validity as this truth-
frequency. Intuitively, (3c) has a probability of 100% in relation to (1c) and (2c).
Similarly, if (1d) were true, then the non-deductive argument form:
 (1d) 90% of swans are white.
 (2d) x is a swan.
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—would have a truth-frequency of 90%, because if we used that argument form 
for every swan (once each) we would be right 90% of the time. Thus, according to 
Williams, (3d) has a probability of 90% in relation to (1d) and (2d).
The truth of the premises may be hypothetical, but Williams denies that there is any-
thing peculiar about truth-frequencies:
The [truth-frequency] in the class of possible inferences whose conclusions are propositions 
concerning biting dogs… our whole treatment… can be reformulated without mention of any-
thing more unearthly and ethereal than the behavior of the flesh-and-blood animals them-
selves… (Williams, 1947, p. 40).
Williams noted the similarities between his theory and Keynes’s, but regards the ‘clas-
sical’ tradition of theorists like Pierre-Simon Laplace as his main influence (Williams, 
1947, pp. 50–1). Nonetheless, Williams’s relationism apparently comes from Keynes, 
because his works only refer to Johnson in passing, nor at all to Leibniz on probability, 
and he does not take credit for relationism in particular.6 Williams was aware of Charles 
S. Peirce’s parallels between probability and deductive logic (Williams, 1947, pp. 196–
200) and therefore his relationism might be from Peirce. Even if so, it was Keynes who 
first presented Williams with a thorough, systematic and explicitly relationist theory.
5.2 Semantics
We have already seen examples of Williams’s probabilities. In general, he contends 
that the probability relation in an argument possessing this form:
 (1) r% of F’s are G’s.
 (2) x is an F.
Therefore, (3) x is a G
—has a value of r% (Williams, 1947, p. 35). While r can be a real number, it can also 
be an interval or qualitative expression like ‘generally’. Hence, Williams agreed with 
Keynes that there are imprecise probabilities.
There many names for this type of argument, but I  shall use Carnap’s (1962, 
pp. 492–8) expression, ‘direct inference’. Many philosophers, like Keynes and Carnap, 
think that there is something right about direct inference. Williams’s atypical claim is 
that he thought that all probabilities were reducible (including via rules like the finite 
additivity axiom) to direct inferences (Williams, 1947, pp. 48–9 and Chapters 4–5). 
Williams regarded this claim as his principal disagreement with Keynes (Williams, 
1947, pp. 50–1).
A version of ‘the Problem of the Reference Class’ applies to Williams’s theory. 
Consider the swans example, but suppose we add two statements to the premises:
 (1e) 90% of swans are white.
 (2e) x is a swan.
 (3e) 10% of animals in the zoo are white.
 (4e) x is an animal in the zoo.
Therefore, (5e) x is white.
6 Williams could not inherit relationism from classical probabilists, who believed in non-relational prob-
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Ninety percent is no longer an intuitive probability for this argument; there is not any 
intuitively obvious objective value. Yet such ambiguous statistical evidence is common 
in science and everyday life. In the context of Williams’s theory, the Problem of the 
Reference Class is the challenge of selecting and combining relevant statistical data in 
the premises about multiple reference classes. Until recently, it seemed that Williams 
was unaware of this problem, but at least some cases of this problem are addressed by 
Williams in a recently published posthumous paper (Williams, 2018) though not the 
particular type above.
5.3 Influence
Both Williams and Keynes saw that relationism implies that induction’s rationality is 
independent of any contingent fact (Keynes, 1921, p. 254; Williams, 1947, Chapter 6). 
The universe might be hospitable to induction by being very regular or inhospitable by 
being very irregular. Yet according to Keynes and Williams, in either case it will be ra-
tional to reason inductively. They would say that, even when we know that induction is 
unreliable and irrational (e.g. we know that our sampling is misleading), we still know 
this unreliability via induction. Therefore, the probabilities of inductive arguments 
are independent of contingent facts, just like deductive validity/invalidity. This idea is 
crucial for Williams’s views on Hume’s Problem of Induction. Hume argued that we 
cannot justify the hypothesis that the universe is induction-friendly by a priori intuition 
(which does not provide knowledge of contingent facts) or by appeal to induction’s 
past successes (which would be circular). Williams agreed, but argued that we can jus-
tify induction using probabilities from direct inference. Like deductive relations, these 
probabilistic relations do not depend on nature’s actual regularity. Consequently, rela-
tionism is vital to Williams’s theory of induction.
5.4 Priors
Williams (1947, p. 192) claims that his theory avoids the problem of assigning priors, 
at least in the case of populations’ compositions, which seems to be why he rejects 
Keynes’s version of the POI. Yet Williams’s analysis of probability entails that such 
priors exist. For example, suppose that there are n mathematically possible distribu-
tions of a binomial random variable in a population. The relative frequency of a par-
ticular distribution i is 1/n. Williams’s usage of direct inference contains no clauses 
to rule out such applications, and thus the prior according to his theory is 1/n, which 
raises the issues discussed in Section 3.4. Therefore, he has not escaped the problem.
6. Henry E. Kyburg
Kyburg (1928–2007) was a key figure in the development of what is now called ‘formal 
epistemology’—the application of logic and mathematics to clarifying and helping 
to answer problems in the theory of knowledge. For instance, his ‘Lottery Paradox’ 
(Kyburg, 1961) proved that a contradiction follows from apparently common sense 
claims about when high probability enables us to accept a hypothesis. Keynes and 
his Cambridge contemporaries were the subjects of Kyburg’s PhD thesis (Kyburg, 
1955) and were Kyburg’s principal influences in the philosophy of probability, along 
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Keynes’s (Kyburg, 1995). For an intellectual and personal autobiography, see Bogdan 
(1982, Part One).
6.1 Interpretation
Kyburg wanted to combine what he saw as insights in both Keynes’s theory and 
frequentist theories: in his view, all true probability statements must mention state-
ments about relative frequencies, but probability statements are not assertions about 
relative frequencies. Instead, probability is about logical relations, as Keynes said. 
The relative frequencies can be empirical (e.g. that a vaccine protects about 95% of 
people against a disease) or mathematical (e.g. the Central Limit Theorem, Bernoulli’s 
theorem, and other combinatoric principles of statistics). For the estimation of rela-
tive frequencies, Kyburg mostly follows frequentist (‘classical’) statistics (Kyburg and 
Teng, 2001, pp. 261–7). However, unlike frequentists, he believes in single-case prob-
abilities: for instance, the probability that this particular coin toss will land Heads, given 
the premise that about half of the coin’s tosses land Heads, is about 50%.7 In general, 
Kyburgian probabilities are relations between (1) premises describing frequencies in 
populations and (2) a conclusion describing a single member of those populations. The 
member could be a single event, but also a set of events.
6.2 Semantics
Like Williams, Kyburg aimed to base his theory on direct inference, but this aim raised 
the Problem of the Reference Class: what if there is ambiguous information in an 
argument’s premises? (See Section 5.) Initially, Kyburg pursued rules for identifying a 
single appropriate reference class among those described in the premises. The reported 
frequency or interval-valued estimate for this reference class would be the conclusion’s 
probability. Kyburg ultimately decided that this was impossible. Instead, he thought 
that such rules could be winnowed down to a set of statements (potentially a unit set) 
plus a rule for combining these statements to generate an interval-valued probability 
(Kyburg and Teng, 2001, Chapter 9). In some cases, these intervals can be degenerate 
intervals, e.g. (0.5, 0.5) for a coin landing Heads, given that it is fair. The technical 
details of Kyburg’s rules for reference class selection are too complex to describe here, 
but these are the core ideas (Kyburg and Teng, 2001):
Conditioning: Statistical data with more relevant conditions takes precedence over data 
with fewer relevant conditions, where their intervals conflict. Suppose if we know both 
(1) the proportion of red balls in an urn and (2) the joint distribution of our non-
random selection process and the red balls’ frequency, then (1) should be ignored 
in favour of (2) for the logical probability of selecting a red ball.
Specificity: Statistical data about reference classes that we know to be subsets of broader ref-
erence takes precedence over the data the broader reference classes, if their intervals conflict. 
For example, we know that white bears are a small proportion of the total popula-
tion of bears, but if we observe a bear-like white object within the Arctic Circle, then 
it is the approximate frequency of bears among bear-like white objects within the 
Arctic Circle is relevant for the conjecture that a bear is approaching.
7 Kyburg often talks of ‘rational corpora’ instead of premises or evidence (Kyburg 1983, p. 209). For sim-
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Precision: Precise statistical data takes precedence over imprecise statistical data, if their 
intervals do not conflict. By ‘conflict’, I mean that neither interval is a subinterval—
possibly improper—of the other. Imagine that we do not know the relative frequency 
with which a particular coin lands Heads. Yet we know that, generally, coins land 
Heads with a frequency close to 50%. We should use the latter data, since it is more 
informative, so that the probability interval is roughly [0.5, 0.5].
The Kyburgian probability is the narrowest interval covering the relative frequency 
data that survives the application of Kyburg’s formal versions of these principles. Note 
that Precision is consistent with Specificity, even though they can favour broader 
and narrower reference classes respectively, because Precision only applies in the ab-
sence of conflict, whereas Specificity only applies in its presence. If we had information 
about the particular coin that conflicted with the general data for coins, the former 
would have priority.
Kyburg rejected all versions of the POI. In relation to premises containing all logico-
mathematical truths, his theory has only these priors:
 (i) [1, 1] if the conclusion is a logico-mathematical truth, e.g. a mathematical fact or 
a tautology.
 (ii) [0, 0] if the conclusion is a logico-mathematical falsehood.
 (iii) [0, 1] otherwise.
—because these priors follow from direct inference using just information from logic 
and mathematics. For instance, (iii) follows from the mathematical fact that a unit-
valued relative frequency must be between 0 and 1, inclusive.
Keynes and Kyburg both advocated imprecise probabilities, but they differed about 
when imprecision occurs. In Keynes’s theory, precision usually occurs when our evi-
dence is sparse and unambiguous, so that his version of the POI applies. In Kyburg’s 
theory, precision usually occurs when our evidence is rich and unambiguous, so that 
we have detailed and non-conflicting statistical evidence.
6.3 Influence
Relationism is crucial for Kyburg’s theory, because direct inferences require prem-
ises. Keynes also influenced Kyburg’s theory of physical probability statements. These 
statements can be empirically wrong. According to Kyburg, physical probabilities are 
the logical probabilities that would be relevant for a demon-like entity that knew all the 
general facts about frequencies in long-run trials, e.g. the frequency of Tails in tossing a 
coin to its limiting relative frequency (Kyburg, 1990, p. 50). Such demons are psycho-
logically impossible because they would have infinitely many beliefs. However, Kyburg 
can consistently adopt this view, due to Keynes’s legacy: that the requisite probability 
relations are abstract logical relations, not psychological facts.
6.4 Priors
Apart from (i–iii) in Section 6.2, Kyburg’s theory implies no priors. This austerity 
avoids the Problem of the Priors, since these intervals do not suggest any unequivocal 
a priori beliefs. However, a supporter of Keynes could reply that there are plausible 
initial priors, e.g. the probability of a coin landing Heads is 1/2. Here, my own intu-
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of evidence about coins. In contrast, if the subject matter is totally unfamiliar (‘What is 
the probability that a Ϭ is ϯ?’), then something imprecise is perhaps more appropriate, 
but the resolution of this disagreement is beyond this article’s scope.
7. David Stove
Stove (1927–94) is perhaps best known for his idiosyncratic polemics against so-
cialism, feminism, social Darwinism, Karl Popper, Christianity etc. (Stove, 2002). 
However, much of his academic writing is in the philosophy of probability and in-
duction. Stove is sometimes identified as a ‘Carnapian’ (Miller 1988, p. 287) and he 
cited Williams as a major influence (Stove, 1986, pp. 62–3). However, an unpublished 
paper8 reveals that he held Keynes in highest regard. Stove describes his theory as 
‘Keynesian’, by which he means the ‘conception of logical probability as degree of 
conclusiveness, a property ascribable to, and only to, arguments’ (Stove, 1960, p. 3). 
Like Harrod and Williams, Stove’s main interest in probability was due to his interest 
in Hume’s Problem of Induction. I shall put that mostly aside and focus on Stove’s 
philosophy of probability. For biographical details, references and intellectual con-
text, see Franklin’s (2003) history of philosophy in Australia, in which Stove is an 
important and recurring character.
7.1 Interpretation
Stove closely follows Keynes on issues of interpretation, but with some idiosyncratic 
emphases. One is Stove’s insistence that the probabilities of arguments are not just 
relative to their premises, but also to their conclusions (Stove, 1960, pp. 17–8). He 
cites several reasons for this emphasis: one was that the idea that ‘The probability of 
H is relative to E’ could encourage the idea that H had a probability that is dependent 
on the truth of a contingent E. Relationists deny that probabilities depend on any 
contingent facts. One departure from Keynes is that he adopts Carnap’s pluralism 
about probability: there are ‘factual’ probabilities, i.e. physical probabilities, which he 
believed require an additional interpretation of probability9 (Stove, 1960, p.  2). In 
writing, Stove never committed to a particular theory of factual probability, though 
he briefly criticised frequentism (Stove, 1986, p. 57). However, this difference is not 
philosophically very important for Stove’s philosophy, since he was mainly interested 
in factual probability statements as premises in arguments, rather than analysing fac-
tual probability’s meaning.
7.2 Semantics
Along with his pluralism, Stove’s most important departure from Keynes was his se-
mantics for logical probability. He used ‘statement of logical probability’ (SLP) to 
refer to an assertion about a probability relation. SLPs can be equalities, such as 
P(H | E) = 0.5, but also inequalities like P(H | E) > 0.5 or categorical statements 
like ‘H is very probable in relation to E’. According to Stove, there are no SLPs that 
8 I am grateful to James Franklin, Stove’s literary executor, for providing me access to this source.
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are both (a) non-trivial and (b) of a high level of generality (Stove, 1986, Chapter 9). 
Here, ‘generality’ means that the SLPs have no restrictions on any variable terms. For 
instance:
(i)   ‘The probability is 1/3 that Abe is a raven in relation to the premise that just one of 
Abe, Barry, and Charlie are ravens’.
—has a very low degree of generality, while:
 (ii)  ‘The probability is 1/3 that x is an F in relation to the premise that just one of x, y, 
and z (x ≠ y ≠ z) is an F’.
—has a high degree of generality, since F, x, y and z are so unspecified.
Stove grants that, while there are some very general SLPs, these are largely unin-
formative claims, e.g. that some inductive arguments have a high probability relation. 
Nor does Stove deny that there are some very informative SLPs, such as (i). However, 
such informative SLPs are apply only to suitable predicates, such as ‘raven’, and do 
not apply for others, e.g. predicates such as ‘rog’, which I am arbitrarily defining as ‘A 
raven if observed prior to 2020 AD or a frog if observed from 2020 AD onwards’.10 
Consequently, sweeping generalisations such as Williams’s principle of direct inference 
and the POI can only be, at best, useful rules-of-thumb.
7.3 Influence
Keynes’s relationism permeates Stove’s entire work on probability and reasoning 
in general. Following Williams, Stove believed Hume’s Problem of Induction to 
be a challenge to establish an SLP: that the premises of some inductive arguments 
confirm their conclusions (Stove, 1986, Chapter III). Stove does not want to jus-
tify all inductions, because induction can be unreasonable e.g. if we know that 
our sampling methods are misleading. Another influence from Keynes is Stove’s 
idea of ‘misconditionalisation’ (Stove, 1960, Sections (ii)–(iv); Stove, 1972). 
Where p is a deductive logical claim or SLP, and c is a contingent statement, then 
misconditionalisations have the form ‘If c, then p’ or ‘If p, then c’. The danger of 
misconditionalisations is that they can lead us to assert false statements when we 
mean true statements. For example:
(i)   ‘That all men are mortal and Socrates is a man implies that Socrates is mortal’ 
—is true, but:
 (ii) ‘That Socrates is a man implies that Socrates is mortal’
—is false. Yet it is easy to misconditionalise:
(iii) ‘If all men are mortal, then that Socrates is a man implies that Socrates is mortal’
—but (iii) is also false. (It has a true antecedent and a false consequent.) Stove ex-
plored how misconditionalisation can lead us from truth to falsity.
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Stove argued that misconditionalisations occur in an number of places in philosophy 
(Stove, 1972). In particular, he argued that the common claim that ‘Induction’s ra-
tionality presupposes that nature is regular’ is a misconditionalisation. According to 
Stove, induction’s rationality consists in non-contingent facts about logical probabil-
ities, whereas nature’s regularity is contingent (Stove, 1986, Chapter 1). Knowing that 
nature is regular would be favourable to induction, but that is not the same claim. 
Stove’s reasoning uses part of Keynes’s legacy: SLPs are not contingent.
7.4 Priors
Stove never explicitly addressed the Problem of the Priors. However, in all his work, he 
never asserted statements like P(H | t) = 0.5. He did assert numerical inequalities 
such as P(H | t) < 1 (Stove, 1986, p. 43) but these do not imply strong a priori be-
liefs. Since Stove’s overall theory and judgements are very akin to Keynes’s, his implicit 
answer seems quite coherent as a modest modification of Keynes’s position in order to 
address the Problem of the Priors. However, Stove’s answer leaves an important ques-
tion for future researchers: what function should such imprecise initial priors have in 
non-deductive learning? Standard Bayesian learning methods assume precise priors, 
so an alternative would be necessary.
8. Conclusion
Kyburg and Stove offer one strategy for Keynesian probabilists to answer the Problem 
of the Priors: use only imprecise priors for empirical hypotheses. Another strategy, 
which Keynes develops in the Treatise (Chapters VI and XXVI), is to exploit the dis-
tinction between logical probability and degrees of belief. Thus, unequivocal initial 
priors for a hypothesis only warrant cautious beliefs, due to low ‘weight of argument’ 
(see Runde, 1990; Brady, 1993; Franklin, 2001, pp.  281–4). The interpretation of 
‘weight’ is controversial, but the basic idea is that strong confidence requires both a 
strong relation of evidence to hypothesis and ample evidence. This epistemologically 
sophisticated approach to probability and belief is also an attractive tool for under-
standing uncertainty, as Post-Keynesian economists have long recognised. As we have 
seen, none of the philosophers that I have discussed has an obviously superior ap-
proach to the problem.
I have been able to indicate Keynes’s influence without even discussing Carnap, the 
most prominent and influential example in the philosophy of probability. As this table 











Keynes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Benenson No No Yes No Noa
Harrod No No Yes Yes No
Williams Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kyburg Yes No Yes No Yes
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This variety indicates the robustness of Keynes’s relationism. Thus, criticisms of a 
particular theory might not generalise across all theories influenced by him. Keynes’s 
relationist interpretation of probability is currently unpopular among philosophers, 
but its robustness should make them wary of dismissing it.
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